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Did the Iraq War Have a Body Bag Effect?
Babak Bahador and Scott Walker .
Did mounting troop casualties during the Iraq War tum the American public against the con-
flict? Analyzing public opinion data from over 400 public polls during the first six years of the war,
this article attempts to identify whether there was a "body bag effect" in play. We create a multi-
variate model that tests a number of potential hypotheses including cumulative and marginal troop
casualty as well as death milestone effects. We find that cumulative casualties provide a better
explanation for the decline in public support than marginal casualties during the Iraq War. Contrary
to the findings from the Korean and Vietnam Wars, this holds true during both periods of escalation
and de-escalation.
Did news of mounting U.S. casualties from the 2003 Iraq War and sub-
sequent insurgency play a role in tuming American public opinion against
the war? This paper will evaluate the relative merits of several competing
explanations for what drove public support during the Iraq War. Using
casualty and public opinion data from March 2003 to December 2008, the
authors examine whether aggregate casualties, marginal casualties, or death
count milestones provide satisfactory explanations for support ofthe war.
This paper is divided into flve sections. The flrst section provides an
overview of the theoretical arguments and previous research relating to the
"body bag effect." It begins by describing why public opinion matters on
issues of war and peace, and subsequently describes the hypothesized causal
mechanism ofthe body bag effect.
In section two, a review of a number of hypotheses regarding how the
body bag effect might work is conducted in order to understand what drove
public opinion after the launch of the Iraq war. Was the relationship driven
by cumulative casualties, marginal casualties, death toll milestones, a cumu-
lative/marginal casualty mix, or does the evidence favor a null hypothesis
relating to elite opinions and partisan cues?
The third section presents the casualty and public opinion data over the
timeline of this study using tables and a flgure. It then assesses the different
hypotheses outlined in the previous section based on a visual examination of
the data to identify any discemable trends.
Section four offers empirical tests for the competing hypotheses pre-
sented in section two to assess if the body bag effect, in conjunction with
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other factors outlined, shaped American public support for the war. In the
final concluding section, the theoretical and practical implications of these
findings are discussed.
The Body Bag Effect
Public Opinion and War
The body bag effect assumes that the death of soldiers in a war impacts
the public's opinion on the war in the country where the soldiers originate,
generally reducing support as deaths increase. Nearly two centuries ago,
von Clausewitz identified the importance of public support for war, arguing
that if a war was to be successful, "the passions that are to be kindled in
war must already be inherent in the people" (von Clausewitz 1993, 101).
Rousseau and Kant, likewise, placed a premium on the public's role, arguing
that wars could be reduced if the decision on their engagement was up to the
people, who paid the ultimate cost (von Clausewitz 1993, 27).
The importance of public opinion in politics is a subject of great con-
tention. Much of the literature is skeptical on public opinion's independence,
suggesting that its malleable nature makes it susceptible to political manipu-
lation (Entman 2000, 2004), Furthermore, because the masses tend to follow
foreign affairs sporadically and mostly during crises, it has been suggested
that the public's knowledge of such matters is rough and superficial (Zaller
1992, 28). Given such shortcomings, some view the consequences of public
opinion on security policy with fear. According to early political communi-
cation scholar Walter Lippman: "The unhappy tmth is that the prevailing
public opinion has been destmctively wrong at the critical junctures. . . .
It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when the stakes are
life and death" (cited in Holsti 2002, 515). Despite these limitations, it is still
difficult in practice to visualize Westem democratic states beginning and
sustaining a war in which the majority of their people do not share the con-
viction to fight (Coker 2001, 48).
The Body Bag Effect
The body bag effect hypothesizes that the public's passion for war (to
use von Clausewitz's characterization) declines as military deaths increase,
due to the changing cost-benefit calculation of the engagement amongst ever
increasing poriions of the population. The most blatant alleged case of this
effect occurred during the Vietnam War, when news of U.S. casualties,
along with televised images of death and destmction, were widely blamed
for tuming the American public against the war, forcing the hand of poli-
ticians towards withdrawal (Hallin 1989, 3). Since Vietnam, according to
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Lawrence Freedman, "it has almost been taken for granted that public opin-
ion in Westem countries, and in particular the United States, is fragile and
easily tumed" (2000, 337).
Bill Clinton, perhaps with the 1993 Somalia debacle fresh on his mind,
appeared to be extremely concemed with a potential body bag effect when
he decided on how military intervention in Kosovo would proceed. On the
eve of the intervention, he went on national television and stated, "I do not
intend to put ground troops in Kosovo to fight a war" (White House 1999).
From a military perspective, this statement appeared naive, as it revealed
information that could put the U.S. at a disadvantage by allowing the enemy
to prepare for the remaining choices. Politically, however, the loss of Ameri-
can life could not be sustained over this particular conflict (Livingston 2000,
377). This concem was further demonstrated by the decisions to fly fighter
jets at 15,000 feet, placing them out of anti-aircraft firing range (Daalder and
O'Hanlon 2000, 94).
Research based on individual-level data has found that other inter-
vening variable besides casualties are also important for public support, in-
cluding the perceived "rightness" of the war, the level of progress, and the
chance of success. Furthermore, findings show that although the public does
not always have accurate knowledge of wartime events, it nonetheless does
shift its attitudes in rational ways (Gelpi etal. 2005; Gelpi 2010). These
studies build on existing research that show variations in public support to
be best explained by the principal policy objective of the war (Jentleson
1992). The public is more likely to tolerate casualties when the United States
is using force to restrain an aggressive state (a defensive objective), and less
likely to support the use of force when its objective is to influence intemal
political change in target countries (an offensive objective). In short, the
public is more Ukely to be supportive when the U.S. is trying to restrain
rather than remake governments.
While the principle of the body bag effect is relatively straightforward,
questions remain regarding how it functions. The next section will introduce
some competing hypotheses about wartime casualties and public opinion in
the context of the Iraq War.
Competing Hypotheses Related to the Body Bag Effect
The Cumulative Effect Hypothesis
John Mueller's seminal book. War, Presidents and Public Opinion, was
the first to examine in depth the relationship between casualties and pubhc
opinion during wartime. Mueller argued that the log of cumulative casualties
was the best determinant of the likely level of public support for war.
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According to his findings, public opinion as a whole is highly sensitive to
early casualties; less sensitive to additional casualties; and again sensitive
when large losses, such as tens of thousands, are recorded at later stages of a
conflict (1973, 62).
According to Mueller, this pattem can be explained by looking at the
entire public as consisting of a series of subgroups, with factions that hold
similar views changing their support for a war based on criteria relevant to
their particular group. In early stages, support drops amongst subgroups with
"considerable misgivings" about the war as evidence of casualties mounts.
These "soft" groups may consist of people who only supported the war to
"rally around the flag" but who were perhaps against the war in principle
(Zaller and Chu 2000, 61-63). After this initial drop, the part of the public
that is still supportive often becomes hardened and accustomed to news of
casualties, and support for the war stabilizes. In the latter stages, however,
subgroups that had always supported the war begin to lose confldence as the
costs begin to clearly outweigh the benefits of the engagement. Once hard-
ened supporters are lost, it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to
sustain a war effort.
Most typically, the cumulative casualty hypothesis contains an assump-
tion that the public uses some sort of rational expectations process when
evaluating policy success (Berinsky 2007). Under this framework, individ-
uals view higher numbers of casualties as a sign that the war is getting worse
for their side, and reduce their support accordingly.
Thus, in line with Mueller:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of total casualties, the lower
the support for the war.
The Marginal Effect Hypothesis
While Mueller's model is a classic approach for examining the wartime
casualty-opinion nexus, it has been challenged by Gartner and Segura, who
argue that marginal casualty numbers (what they term "temporally proxi-
mate costs") are more important than cumulative numbers in determining the
direction of public opinion—especially when casualties are rising (1998,
278). The authors argue that by examining marginal casualties, several
shortcomings with Mueller's cumulative casualty model can be overcome.
First, the concept of cumulative casualties is problematic because it is not
distinguishable from the variable of time, which can by itself erode support
due to war weariness and the end of the short-term boost from the "rally
around the flag" effect. The authors argue that marginal casualties are not
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linked to time and should, therefore, be able to account for the subtle im-
pacts of changing casualty rates and other events on opinion.
Second, Gartner and Segura claim that marginal casualties have the
advantage of potentially accounting for events that may increase support for
the war effort, such as declining casualty rates or other extemal events.
These subtleties would be lost if measured solely by cumulative casualties,
especially over a long period. Thus, while Mueller's research suggests that
major events in a war make no difference to public opinion, Gartner and
Segura find that events can either increase or decrease support. Therefore, in
this study, both cumulative and marginal casualty numbers are examined to
determine which is a more accurate indicator of public opinion fluctuation.
Thus, consistent with Gartner and Segura:
Hypothesis 2: Increases (decreases) in monthly casualties will
lead to decreases (increases) in approval for the war.
The Significant Marginal Effect Hypothesis
It is also possible that the public may become insensitive to small
monthly changes in casualties, particularly in an extended confiict over a
number of years. In such a situation, opinion may respond more acutely to
large marginal changes on a month-to-month basis. This seems intuitive, as
it is likely that public and media attention decline over time unless some-
thing extraordinary occurs. News is, after all, about what is new.
Thus, we suggest a variant of the hypothesis above:
Hypothesis 2a: Significant (>50%) increases (decreases) in
monthly casualty averages lead to corresponding decreases
(increases) in public support for the war.
The Milestone Hypothesis
If wartime events are key drivers of support for the war, as Gartner and
Segura argue, then it is possible that body cotmt thresholds also matter. As
casualties reach new milestones (e.g., 500, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000
battle deaths), the public may interpret each new milestone as further evi-
dence that the coimtry's war effort has sunk to a new low. Whether the
public includes such milestones in their calculations of how well the war
will go over the long term, or whether they view these new body count
thresholds merely as reasons to feel pessimistic for the immediate future
cannot be ascertained in a study that looks at aggregate measures of public
opinion. But one would expect that if the media put enough focus on these
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major milestones, the public would in one way or another assess the future
of the war in a negative way.
Thus,
Hypothesis 3: Support will be lower following months when total
casualties reach significant milestones.
The War Duration Hypothesis
Gartner and Segura argue that when examining the impact of casualties
on the level of public support for the war, one must explicitly account for the
duration of the war. The authors thus include the number of days since the
onset of the war as an independent variable. By controlling for the role of
time in this way, the authors argue that it is possible to isolate the effects of
the casualty variables (1998, 287).
Thus,
Hypothesis 4: The greater the duration of the conflict, the lower
the level of support for the war.
Gartner and Segura's Marginal/Cumulative Mix Hypothesis
In their analysis of both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, Gartner and
Segura (1998) create a model that attempts to reconcile the cumulative vs.
marginal casualty debate. They theorize that "marginal casualties are a better
predictor of opposition during periods of escalation or continuous fighting,
but cumulative casualties are more likely to serve that purpose during
periods of de-escalation" (Gartner and Segura 1998, 286). The reason for
this trend is that during times of escalation, the public is sensitive to changes
in casualties, but during times of de-escalation or non-continuous flghting,
people are unlikely to shift their positions merely due to fluctuations in mar-
ginal casualties. For instance, a decline in marginal casualty rates is unlikely
to change the minds of those opposed to involvement in the war due to the
high overall costs.
Gartner and Segura test this hypothesis by creating a data set that com-
bines monthly casualty and public support data for both the Korean and
Vietnam Wars. Pooling the data for the two wars increases the number of
observations and increases the generalizability of the study. To test their
hypothesis, the authors create a model that compares the rate of casualties
over the previous 120 days with that of the prior 120-day period. The
authors flnd that cumulative casualties matter more than marginal casualties
for public opinion support when casualties are declining (i.e., when the
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previous 120 days records fewer casualties than the 120-day period preced-
ing that). In times of increasing casualties, however, marginal casualties
matter more than cumulative casualties as a driver of opposition to the war.
Does this same pattem hold tme for the Iraq War? Although the overall
magnitude of casualties was lower compared to Korea and Vietnam, the
conflict exhibited a similar initial rally in public support followed by a
gradual decline. As such, we test whether a similar trend was in play in Iraq.
Thus,
Hypothesis 5: Increases in marginal casualties will result in
lower support for the war during periods of rising casualties;
conversely, increases in cumulative casualties will lead to lower
support during times of falling casualties. •
The Null Hypothesis
The possibility remains that there is no systematic relationship between
any of these factors (i.e., cumulative, marginal, or milestones) and public
opinion. Berinsky (2009) argues that the dominant paradigm, in which
changes in individual rational expectations about the prospects for success
lead to changes in support, is flawed. In fact, he argues that day-to-day polit-
ical events do not affect the public's perceptions of the conflict very much.
In this anti-rational expectations approach, Berinsky finds that members of
the public use elite positions as cues for their opinions conceming war.
If Berinsky's reasoning holds tme for the Iraq War, then battle deaths
are independent of public opinion, except as filtered through elite opinion in
the form of partisan cues. To illustrate this point, Berinsky uses a compari-
son between the Iraq War and World War II. During the Iraq war, declining
support among elites in the American political system led to a decline in
support for the war, as partisan supporters of those who opposed the war
followed the cues of opinion leaders. However, Berinsky finds that this elite
split did not emerge during World War II, and therefore support did not
waver despite growing casualties.
In a follow-up study, Berinsky surveyed Americans in 2005, and found
that casualty information, or "the scope of^the human cost of war," had little
or no effect on citizens' support for the Iraq War. Instead, it was citizens'
attachments to particular political leaders that was the most important factor
(2009). According to Berinsky, then, elite opinions drive mass opinion rather
than wartime events such as casualties.
While our methodology does not allow us to test this hypothesis at an
individual level, we can nonetheless observe whether aggregate support for
the war is responsive to casualties and milestones. If it is not, these fmdings
provide additional support to Berinsky's domestic politics argument.
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Thus,
Hypothesis 6: Wartime body bag counts and milestones do not
drive public support for the war.
A Visual Inspection of the Relationship
between Casualties and Public Support
From the beginning of the Iraq War on March 21, 2003, until the end of
2008, over 4,000 American soldiers died in the Iraq War. Over the same
time period, public support for the war declined from approximately 70 per-
cent to 35 percent, with most of this decline occurring in the first year of the
war. This section of the paper reviews the hypotheses outlined in the pre-
vious section that can be examined through a visual inspection of public
support and casualty data. The public support monthly data is based on the
average support for each month from 439 polls—or approximately six polls
per month, on average—conducted over the timeline. These polls were
conducted by the following organizations: CNN/USA/Gallup, CNN/Opinion
Research Corp., ABC News/Washington Post/TNS, Newsweek/Princeton
SRA, PEW Research/Council on Foreign Relations/Princeton SRA, CBS
News, Fox News/Opinion Dynamics, USA Today/Gallup, Quinnipiac Uni-
versity, Time/SRBI, Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg, Associated Press/
IPSOS, Program on Intemational Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks and
University of Pennsylvania. Support is measured by the percentage of people
who responded favorably to questions asking whether they support the war
or not. An example is the following question asked in the CNN/USA Today
Poll: "Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war in Iraq?" (2007). Casualty data
are gathered from the website of Globalsecurity.org.
As mentioned earlier, Mueller's research found two trends on the rela-
tionship of casualties and public opinion support for war. First, one should
expect a decline in support with early casualties from segments of the popu-
lation that rallied around the flag, but had misgivings about the decision to
go to war. During the 2003 Iraq war, support for the war increased by up to
20 percent in the last few months before the start of the war, presumably
from those rallying around the flag once the decision to fight appeared
imminent. Mueller's second finding was that after an initial drop, remaining
supporters become hardened to casualties until much larger battle death
numbers in the tens of thousands emerge.
In observing the data on casualties and public opinion, outlined in
Figure 1 and Table 1, there is visual evidence supporting Mueller's flndings.
First, while support peaked at 70 percent from the start of the war until May
2003, it declined rapidly following evidence of a growing insurgency anda
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Figure 1. Casualties and Public Opinion from the Iraq War, 2003-08
Table 1. Casualties and Public Opinion from the Iraq War, 2003-08
Month
Mar-03
Apr-03
May-03
Jun-03
Jul-03
Aug-03
Sep-03
Oct-03
Nov-03
Dec-03
Jan-04
Feb-04
Mar-04
Apr-04
May-04
Jun-04
Jul-04
Aug-04
Monthly
Casualties
65
74
37
30
48
35
31
44
82
40
47
20
52
135
80
42
54
66
Cumulative
Casualties
65
139
176
206
254
289
320
364
446
486
533
553
605
740
820
862
916
982
Marginal
% Change
_
14
-50
-19
60
-27
-11
42
86
-51
18
-57
160
160
-41
-48
29
22
Opinion
% Support
72
74
68
62
64
61
60
57
55
61
59
63
54
52
49
48
47
49
table continues
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Table 1. Casualties and Public Opinion from the Iraq War, 2003-08
(continued)
Month
Sep-04
Oct-04
Nov-04
Dec-04
Jan-05
Feb-05
Mar-05
Apr-05
May-05
Jun-05
Jul-05
Aug-05
Sep-05
Oct-05
Nov-05
Dec-05
Jan-06
Feb-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Monthly
Casualties
80
64
137
72
107
58
35
52
80
78
54
85
49
96
84
68
62
55
31
76
69
61
43
65
72
106
70
112
83
81
81
104
126
101
80
84
66
38
37
23
40
29
Cumulative
Casualties
1,062
1,126
1,263
1,335
1,442
1,500
1,535
1,587
1,667
1,745
1,799
1,884
1,933
2,029
2,113
2,181
2,243
2,298
2,329
2,405
2,474
2,535
2,578
2,643
2,715
2,821
2,891
3,003
3,086
3,167
3,248
3,352
3,478
3,579
3,659
3,743
3,809
3,847
3,884
3,907
3,947
3,976
Marginal
% Change
21
-20
114
-47
49
-46
-40
49
54
-3
-31
57
-42
96
-13 ,
-19
-9
-11
-44
145
-9
-12
-30
51
11
47
-34
60
-26
-2
0
28
21
-20
-21
5
-21
-42
-3
-38
74
-28
Opinion
% Support
53
51
49
44
46
49
46
46
48
45
48
46
45
45
42
46
46
44
43
43
40
42
44
41
44
39
40
39
38
38
39
39
34
35
34
34
37
39
35
37
35
37
.. . table continues
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Table 1. Casualties and Public Opinion from the Iraq War, 2003-08
(continued)
Month
Mar-08
Apr-08
May-08
Jun-08
Jul-08
Aug-08
Sep-08
Oct-08
Nov-08
Dec-08
Monthly
Casualties
39
52
19
29
13
23
25
14
17
14
Cumulative
Casualties
4,015
4,067
4,086
4,115
4,128
4,151
4,176
4,190
4,207
4,221
Marginal
% Change
34
33
-63
53
-55
77
9
-44
21
-18
Bold indicates months when numerical battle death milestones are reached.
Opinion
% Support
34
35
33
33
36
35
40
37
36
35
rise in casualties. This drop of approximately 20 percent, which equates to
the growth of support in the months just before the war's rally effect, took
place over two stages. The flrst drop occurred in the flrst four months after
the end of "major combat operations," as support fell from approximately
70 percent to 60 percent. The second occurred in the subsequent eight
months, when support declined another 10 percent, reaching 49 percent by
May 2004. This trend appeared to follow the initial decline in support that
Mueller observed during the Vietnam War with early casualties.
Next, while support continued to decline, it happened only very grad-
ually after the flrst year, reaching the mid-3 Os by the summer of 2007, when
Iraq appeared to be in the middle of a civil war and American casuahies
grew rapidly with a troop surge. From this point, however, support remained
relatively stable, even as marginal casualties declined and the worst of the
violence subsided by 2008. This, to some degree, was in line with the second
part of Mueller's argument as support held in the 35 to 40 percent range with
hardened supporters remaining committed in spite of continuing casualties.
Since the number of American casualties in Iraq never reached the vol-
umes seen during the Vietnam War, it is unlikely that hardened supporters
would stop supporting the war, as they did eventually in Vietnam. Nonethe-
less, a number of milestones (500, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, and 4,000 casualty
marks) are identifled in Figure 1 and Table 1 to visually assess if any notice-
able decline in support was present in the months after these milestones were
reached. These milestones are also highlighted in bold in Table 1.
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When the milestones are reached, there does not appear to be any dis-
cemable pattem of decline in public opinion in subsequent months. In Jan-
uary 2004 and March 2008, when deaths reached 500 and 4,000, respec-
tively, public support rose slightly the following month. In September 2004,
October 2005 and December 2006 when deaths reach 1,000, 2,000 and
3,000, respectively, support declined slightly the following month. Thus,
there does not appear to be much support for Hypothesis 3, as these mile-
stones do not appear to have any discemable pattem of impact on public
opinion based purely on a visual inspection.
The next visual inspection relates to Hypothesis 2a, which deals with
the impact of marginal casualties, both positive and negative, on public sup-
port for the war. In this assessment, incremental casualty changes of > ±50
percent versus the previous month are identified and the support level of the
following month is reviewed to determine if such shifts in casualties lead to
changes in opinion in the expected direction. In total, 18 months out of the
entire timeline recorded monthly shifts in casualties > ±50 percent (14 in-
creases, 4 decreases). However, only half of the shifts in casualties lead to
changes in opinion in the expected direction the following month. As such,
the visual inspection of this possible relationship also shows no obvious
trend. The findings from this inspection are outlined in Table 2.
In summary, while a visual examination of the public opinion time
series suggests some notable reactions to wartime casualties, there is no
clear effect for larger-than-average shifts in monthly casualties or body
count milestones. Perhaps most notably, the relationship between casualties
and support for the Iraq War over time seems to share many commonalities
with the pattem Mueller identified in the Vietnam War, as the public was
more sensitive to casualties earlier in the conflict than during later stages.
The next section will test the hypotheses laid out in section 2 about the
drivers of public support through a multivariate analysis.
A Multivariate Analysis of Casualties and Public Opinion
Creating a Model
In section 2 we presented some simple testable hypotheses relating to
the body bag effect, and in section 3 we made observations based on a visual
inspection of the monthly time series of casualties and support for the Iraq
War. It appears from our analysis so far that large marginal casualties are not
of primary importance in driving public support for the war. Moreover, the
achievement of casualty milestones does not appear to make much of a dif-
ference. However, we believe a full inspection of the relationship between
casualties and support for the war necessitates the use of a statistical ap-
proach.
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Table 2. Significant Marginal Casualty Changes
and Support from the Iraq War, 2003-08
Month
Jul-03
Aug-03
Nov-03
Dec-03
Jan-04
Feb-04
Mar-04
Apr-04
May-04
Nov-04
Dec-04
May-05
Jun-05
Aug-05
Sep-05
Oct-05
Nov-05
Apr-06
May-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
May-08
Jun-08
Jul-08-
Aug-08
Sep-08
Only the months that record a > ±50% change in casualties are in this table. The (Y) and (N) indicate
yes and no, respectively, on the question of whether opinion follows the expected direction when
there are significant shifts in casualties.
In this section, we use multivariate analysis to further test for the valid-
ity of each of the hypotheses. Ideally, multivariate models can test not only
for whether an individual factor has an effect on a dependent variable in iso-
lation, but also which proposition among many possess the greatest explana-
tory power. Although Ray (2002) wams against simply tossing several
Marginal
% Change
60
86
-51
-57
160
160
114
54
57
96
145
51
60
74
-63
53
-55
77
Opinion
% Change
64
61 (Y)
55
61 (N)
59 (N)
63
54 (N)
52 (Y)
49 (Y)
49
44 (Y)
48
45 (Y)
46
45 (Y)
45
42 (Y)
43
40 (Y)
41
44 (N)
39
38 (Y)
35
37 (N)
33
33 (N)
36 (N)
35 (N)
40 (N)
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variables into the same linear model without theoretical explanations for
doing so, it is common methodological practice to make several hypotheses
"compete" against each other, assuming that one has theoretically valid
reasons for including each variable.
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we create a variable that represents the
cumulative death count up to and including a given month. This death count
is hypothesized to be related to overall war weariness, and one would expect
support for the war to decline as totals go up. In order to avoid problems
with heteroskedasticity in our model, we use the log of cumulative casual-
ties.
We also create two measures for recent or marginal casualties. Follow-
ing from Hypothesis 2, the first is the percentage change from the previous
month. This measure captures any shifts in support for the war based on the
most recent casualty information. In order to capture Hypothesis 2a, we
create dummy variables that capture monthly fluctuations in the death toll of
greater or less than 50 percent. The idea is that public opinion may be
sensitive to radical upward or downward shifts in the death count. We
hypothesize here that sharp upward shifts in the monthly death count will
increase public support for the war in the subsequent month, while sharp
downward shifts will lead to a decrease in support.
Next, following Hypothesis 3 above, we create a dummy variable to
capture each major body bag milestone. The variable is coded " 1 " for the
month after the body counts reach 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, 2,500, and 3,000
and 4,000; otherwise it is coded as "0." If the public takes milestones into its
assessments of how the war is going, then the effect of this variable will be
positive and statistically signiflcant.
To account for the effect of the duration of the war, as outlined in
Hypothesis 4, we create a variable called wardays that represents the total
number of days that have passed since the beginning of the Iraq War.
In order to test Hypothesis 5, the mixed cumulative-marginal casualty
hypothesis of Gartner and Segura (1998), we create two competing models.
In the flrst model, the "intuitive" model, it is expected that marginal casual-
ties lead to lower levels of support for the war during periods of rising
casualties, while greater cumulative casualties drive support down in times
of declining casualties. The second model, the "counterintuitive" model,
suggests the opposite of what Gartner and Segura hypothesize. Marginal
casualties matter during times of declining casualties, while cumulative
casualties are salient during times of rising casualties.
Following Gartner and Segura, for the "intuitive" model we examine
the effect of the marginal casualty variable only during months that occur
during times of rising casualties, coding the cumulative casualty variable as
zero. Likewise, during times of declining casualties, we code the marginal
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casualty variable as zero, and examine only the effect of cumulative casual-
ties.
Conversely, for the "counterintuitive" model, during months that occur
during periods of rising casualties we use only the cumulative casualty
variable, coding the marginal casualty variable as zero. Likewise, during
periods of falling casualties, we examine only the effect of marginal casual-
ties, coding the cumulative casualty variable as zero.
Times of rising casualties are coded as periods in which casualties dur-
ing the previous 120 days were higher than they were during the 120 days
prior to that. Likewise, times of declining casualties are defined as periods in
which casualties during the previous 120 days were lower than during the
120-day period prior to that.
If Gartner and Segura are correct, we would expect that the marginal
and cumulative casualty numbers will be statistically significant in the "intu-
itive" model, but that they will not achieve significance in the "counter-
intuitive" model. If they are not correct we will not notice a statistical differ-
ence between the coefficients for marginal and cumulative casualties in the
two models.
Finally, we test Hypothesis 6, the proposition that neither cumulative
nor marginal casualties matter. If the coefficients for both marginal and
cumulative casualties are not statistically significant, this will lend support to
the idea that body bag counts do not explain public support for the war, and
we thus assume domestic political factors offer the most satisfactory
answers.
Methodological Approach for Predicting Support for the War
As mentioned, this section attempts to assess the role of body bag
factors in predicting public opinion support for the war. Data are taken from
the first seventy-two months of the war. The dependent variable is the per-
centage of the public that supports the war effort. The independent variables
are the cumulative death count, the monthly death count, a battle death mile-
stone variable, and a dummy variable that captures whether or not deaths
increased or decreased by 50 percent in a given month.
The method for answering this question is a multivariate regression
using time series analysis. We create a model that predicts the level of sup-
port for the war in a given month. In other words, we observe whether these
factors actually have an effect on public support that is significantly different
than what we would expect to see by random chance.
Our model is specified as: . ' .;
- • * •
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Public Support = Cumulative Casualties + Marginal Casualties +
Increase 50 + Decrease 50 + Milestone + Wardays
where public support is the dependent variable, and all of the other factors
on the right-hand side of the equation are explanatory variables. Table 3 con-
tains a list of all variables to be tested in the model, and includes a descrip-
tion of what values a variable can take in a given month. It also discusses
which effect we hypothesize might occur in conjunction with an increase in
the value of a given variable (for instance, we might see higher levels of
death in a month associated with lower levels of support for the war).
We test our model using a Box-Jenkins regression. Because we are
using time series data, using a standard Ordinary Least Squares regression
leaves open the possibility that our model would violate the assumption that
the mean of each independent variable does not vary over time (i.e., that
each mean is stationary). Because diagnostic tests show that one of our inde-
pendent variables (cumulative casualties) has a non-stationary mean, using
OLS regression on that variable would violate the assumption of indepen-
dence between the dependent and independent variables. The result could be
a spurious regression: public approval for the war and cumulative casualties
might be correlated when a third factor, such as time, is really driving their
relationship. Moreover, standard flxes for first-order serial correlation (the
Prais-Winston and Cochrane-Orcutt procedures), do not eliminate the prob-
lem of non-stationarity in the data. The Box Jenkins approach allows one to
remove the time dependence in the model so that its residuals are a 'white
noise' process (i.e., there is no serial correlation in the error term).
The basic model for a Box Jenkins model is D(d)Y,=ao+AR(P) +
MA(q) +Ey, where Y, is a stationary time series, ao is the constant, AR(p)
indicates the number of autogressive structures, D(d) is the number of times
that Y, must be differenced for the series to become stationary, and Ey is the
error term. The statistical processes underlying the series are modeled using
the ARIMA (Enders 2004) auto-regression integrated moving average) iden-
tiflcation and estimation procedures described in Enders (2004). We find
that the only Box-Jenkins model that creates white noise residuals is an
ARIMA (0,1,1) specification, meaning that the best specifled model is one
that uses zero autoregressive structures, one differencing parameter, and one
moving average parameter. Diagnostic tests of the residuals of this ARIMA
(0,1,1) model (the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Ljung-Box g'-statistic
and the Phillips-Perron test) reveal no serious threat of non-stationarity, and
an inspection of the cross-correlations of the error term at different time lags
reveals no signs of signiflcant autocorrelation. Therefore, we can say that
(unlike OLS), our models do not violate the assumption of independence
between the independent and dependent variables (Enders 2004).
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Table 3. Summary of Independent Variables
Variable
Cumulative
Casualties
Monthly
Casualties
50% Increase
50% Decrease
Milestone
Wardays
Description
Sum of All Casualties
Since Beginning of War
Number of Casualties in a
Given Month
Coded as ' r When Increase
of >50% in Rate of Casualties
From the Previous Month;
Otherwise Coded as '0'
Coded as ' 1 ' When Decrease
of >50% in Rate of Casualties
From the Previous Month;
Otherwise Coded as '0 '
Month in Which Death Toll Hits
500, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000 and 4,000
Number of Days Since Onset of War
Hypothesized Effect
Decrease In Support
Decrease in Support
Decrease in Support
Increase in Support
Decrease in Support
Decrease in Support
The Evidence
Do we find evidence for the body bag effect? And if so, which of the
hypotheses best predict public support for the war?
The evidence from Table 4, which includes all models, makes a strong
case for Hypothesis 1. Analysis of time series data from the first six years of
the war suggests that cumulative casualties are a key force behind support
for the war: the higher the number of cumulative deaths, the lower the level
of support for the war. While the impact of one casualty may not be of great
importance overall, the result of several thousand casualties may be telling.
Model 1, which contains only the parameter for cumulative casualties, pre-
dicts the degree of support for the Iraq War quite well. In fact. Model 1 per-
forms as well or almost as well as Model 3, which contains all of the vari-
ables listed in Table 3. According to two "goodness of fit" measures, the
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and the BIC (Bayesian Information
Criterion), the fit of Model 1 to the data is the best of any of the models.
Model 2 (which contains both cumulative and marginal casualties) and
Model 3 (which contains all of the variables listed in Table 2) do not per-
form noticeably better in terms of goodness of fit. Moreover, the effect
of the log of cumulative casualties is statistically significant in all of the
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Table 4. Tests of Hypotheses
Variable
Cumulative
Casualties
Marginal
Casualties
50% Increase
50% Decrease
Milestone
Wardays
CAS120UP
CAS120DOWN
Log CASDOWN
Log CASUP
Prob > F
N
Aie
BIC
Model 1
-17.20***
(3.69)
0.000
72
347.83
356.94
Model 2
-16.30***
(4.57)
-.13
(.46)
0.000
71
345.99
357.31
Model 3
-15.26*
(7.36)
-.003
(.012)
-.822
(1.24)
-2.92*
(1.29)
-.55
(.80)
-.08
(1.04)
0.000
71
345.79
366.15
Model 4
(Intuitive)
-1.22
(.81)
-2.98**
(1.14)
-.71
(.91)
-.005
(1.02)
-.03*
(.01)
-2.65*
(1.08)
0.000
65
317.62
337.19
Model 5
(Counter)
-1.18
(.85)
-2.75*
(1.20)
-.20
(1.03)
.06
(1.16)
.003
(.011)
.122
(.90)
0.000
65
323.99
343.56
Standard errors in parentheses; *p <.O5; **p <.O1 ; ***p <.OO1, one-tailed tests.
Values reported are regression coefficients. For each model, the values of the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test statistic, the Ljung-Box ^-statistic, and the Phillips-Perron statistic are available from the
authors.
models. It is therefore clear that the factor that has the greatest of the
explanatory power in terms of predicting approval is the log of cumulative
casualties.
By comparison, we do not find much support for Hypothesis 2. While
higher levels of marginal monthly casualties are associated with lower levels
of support for the war in the following month in Models 2 and 3, the coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant. Likewise, the fit of Model 2 (which in-
cludes both marginal and cumulative casualties) to the data is slightly worse
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than the fit of Model 1 according to the AIC measure, and only slightly
better according to the BIC measure. When we test the effect of marginal
casualties in a bivariate model to identify its independent effect on the
dependent variable (regression results not shown), the coefficient for mar-
ginal casualties is not statistically significant. Thus, it is apparent that the log
of cumulative casualties plays a more important role than marginal casual-
ties in predicting levels of support for the Iraq War.
But perhaps the public only responds to very large short-term shifts in
casualty rates, while it fails to react to small ones. Hypothesis 2a is designed
to account for this possibility by suggesting that only sizeable monthly
casualty rate changes (either 50 percent higher or lower) have an impact on
support for the war. An examination of Model 3 reveals that the effect of
the dummy variable that denotes months where casualty rates increased by
50 percent is not statistically signiflcant. This suggests that the public is not
likely to drop its support for the war in response to sharp increases in
casualties.
In contrast, the coefficient for large monthly decreases in casualties is
negatively signed and statistically significant, meaning that months follow-
ing 50 percent of greater monthly declines in casualties are associated with
lower approval for the war. This is an unexpected finding, as there does not
appear to be any intuitive reason why mass publics would be less likely to
support a confiict immediately following a sizeable downward shift in
casualties. We think that the best single explanation for this statistical rela-
tionship can be found at a single time point in the data set. In February of
2004, the marginal casualty change was -57 percent, but the approval rate
for the war fell from 63 percent in February to 54 percent in March. This
drop in approval, although it followed a month during which casualties fell
sharply, constitutes the highest monthly opinion shift of the entire 72-month
period in either direction. Thus, the month of March 2004 alone can entirely
explain the statistically significant relationship in the model, as its exclusion
from the data set makes the relationship lose its statistical significance.
Why did this curious drop in support occur? We believe that while mar-
ginal casualties dropped sharply in February 2004, it was during this time
that the Iraqi insurgency began to strengthen dramatically, shattering the
illusion that the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 would effec-
tively end the war. Due to this loss of public confidence from the growing
insurgency, even a sharp drop in marginal casualties did very little to
assuage public fears about the war. Another possible explanation is that
while deaths were sharply down in February, they rapidly increased again in
March. Thus, some polling in March may have occurred after battle deaths
began to take a sharp tum in an upward direction.
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March 2004 aside, we do not find much evidence for Hypothesis 2a.
Thus, there is little reason to believe that sharp increases or decreases in
monthly casualties play an important role in determining support levels for
the Iraq War.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that in the month after the cumulative death toll
reaches an important psychological milestone (i.e., 500, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000,
and 4,000 deaths), levels of support will be lower than the previous month.
However, we do not find that the coefficient for the milestones dummy vari-
able is statistically significant. Nor does the inclusion of the milestone vari-
able noticeably improve overall model fit. However, when one analyzes the
1,000-casualty threshold in isolation from the others, its effect is statistically
significant. This would appear to make sense, as the symbolic 1,000 number
is quite possibly the biggest psychological barrier amongst the options
reviewed.
The generally weak performances of Hypotheses 2, 2a, and 3 suggest
that one should not place much weight in the claim that short-term changes
in casualties drive the level of support for the Iraq War.
According to Hypothesis 4, support for the war is likely to erode over
time as the war progresses. An examination of Model 3 shows that the find-
ings do not support the idea that the duration of the conflict is associated
with lower levels of support. The coefficient for the wardays variable is in
the expected direction, but it is not statistically significant.
Next, we examine Hypothesis 5, relating to Gartner and Segtira's
(1998) findings that marginal casualties matter more for public support dur-
ing periods of rising casualties, while cumulative casualties matter more
during times of falling casualties. We find some evidence to suggest that
similar trends were at play during the first six years of the Iraq War. Models
4 and 5 are replications of the two competing models that Gartner and
Segura use to test whether the relative salience of cumulative and marginal
casualties depends upon whether wartime casualties have been rising or
declining over the past several months of the confiict.
Our Model 4 is similar to their first "intuitive" model, which examines
marginal casualties only during times when the four-month trend is upward.
In phases when casualties are in a downward trend, it treats marginal casual-
ties as zero. In this way. Model 4 captures only the effect of marginal casual-
ties during times of escalating battle deaths. Likewise, it captures the number
of cumulative casualties only in periods when the previous four months have
recorded decreasing casualties. The "counterintuitive" model (which we
recreate in Model 5) does just the opposite—it captures the effect of mar-
ginal casualties only when the four-month casualty trend points downward
and the effect of cumulative casualties only when the trend is upward. If
Gartner and Segura's hypothesis is tme, then both estimates in the intuitive
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model would be statistically signiflcant, while neither of the estimates in the
counterintuitive model would be.
We find support for Gartner and Segura's hypothesis. The two "intui-
tive" parameters in Model 4 (marginal casuahies during times of rising body
bag counts and cumulative casualties during times of declining body bag
counts) are both statistically signiflcant, as an increase in both is associated
with lower levels of support. At the same time, the coefficients for the two
"counterintuitive" variables are not statistically signiflcant. The fact that the
same relationship emerged for three different conflicts would appear to lend
support the possibility that the popularity of wars occurs in the context of
how well the war seems to be going at the time. However, we must view the
apparently successful replication of Gartner and Segura's analysis with cau-
tion. The goodness of flt measures (the AIC and BIC) for the intuitive mea-
sure are actually slightly worse than they are for the counterintuitive model.
And the goodness of flt of Model 4 is not as good as that of Model 3, which
includes all ofthe variables we propose to test in Table 3. So we cannot say
that Gartner and Segura's model does a better job of predicting support for
the war. The inconclusive nature of their results suggests that more work is
necessary before we can conflrm or reject their hypothesis.
As for Hypothesis 6, the null hypothesis, our statistical resuhs demon-
strate that there was a clear decline in support for the war as cumulative
casualties mounted. Thus, the evidence from our model suggests that we
should reject the null hypothesis that wartime casualty flgures do not affect
public support for the war. If partisan cues or other domestic factors are in
operation, then they exist in the context of a mounting body bag count. How-
ever, it is impossible to confirm this without individual level data to under-
stand whether the public is responding to deaths directly or indirectly
through other factors such as elite cues.
In short, we can say that the best predictor of support for the war in a
given month during the war is the number of cumulative casuahies. We can
see this in the "goodness of flt" model statistics in Table 4. The fact that
Model 1 flts the data as well or better than any model suggests that most of
the variation in support for the Iraq War can be explained by long-term
casualty flgures, not short-term variations in body bag counts, the achieve-
ment of signiflcant death count milestones, or the duration oftime itself.
Conclusion
Was the body bag effect a factor in the Iraq War? An analysis of the
relationship between the monthly time series of support for the war over the
flrst six years and a number of purported covariates suggests that, more than
anything else, it is the overall number of deaths that influence public support
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for the war. Cumulative casualties appear to have a greater effect on support
than either monthly changes in casualties, the attainment of significant war
death milestones, or the passage of time itself While our analyses do not
completely refute the idea that the relative importance of marginal and cum-
ulative casualties may vary upon whether deaths are trending upward or
downward, it is clear that the best predictor of monthly variations in support
is the log of cumulative casualties.
We conclude by suggesting that because the public is sensitive to
cumulative battle deaths, it appears to be collectively rational and capable of
developing attitudes about the conflict from information about the war. Such
a finding falls in line with those of other researchers who argue that the
public assesses their govemment's involvement in wars in a rational fashion.
However, in the case of the Iraq War, it appears that the public was not
particularly focused on monthly fluctuations in the number of body bags.
We must consider the possibility that the lower and more stable levels of
monthly casualties did not evoke the same type of reactions from the public
as was the case during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
It is important to note that our analysis has been based on the examina-
tion of aggregate-level data. Berinsky (2007) argues that such wartime infor-
mation does have a role in shaping public opinion. However, his individual-
level studies argue that elite cues play a powerful role in the filtering of this
information to the public. Nonetheless, the evidence here suggests that indi-
viduals do appear to be somewhat rational about wartime information, at
least in the long term. Furthermore, events after 2008 in the Afghanistan
War, which recorded a decline in public support even as both Republican
and Democrat political leaders officially supported the war, provides addi-
tional weight to our findings and suggests that the public can be rational and
even independent of elite cues.
Future research will need to devise mechanisms to test other versions of
the body bag effect. It will be useful to understand, for example, the role that
a decline in war support has on the policy process. In the case of the Iraq
War, strategy changed a number of times in response to the war's perceived
lack of success. It will be important to find ways to identify and assess the
impact of those policy changes over the timeline of the study, and to use
individual-level data to determine whether there is a link between such
policy shifts and changes in the level of public support.
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